國立陽明交通大學|心智哲學研究所 https://phil.nycu.edu.tw 心智哲學研究所 Wed, 15 Sep 2021 08:22:09 +0000 zh-TW hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=5.1.11 【2021智齡講堂】暢談生死的資深公民講師(線上直播) https://phil.nycu.edu.tw/post-0043/ Wed, 08 Sep 2021 03:43:54 +0000 https://phil.ym.edu.tw/?p=1510

原定2021年5月開始的系列演講活動「暢談生死的資深公民講師」,因疫情影響改為線上直播形式,第二場將在9月15日登場囉!敬請鎖定我們的YOUTUBE直播平台!來不及跟上直播的朋友也別擔心,每一場直播影片都會在這個網頁上架更新。

此次演講由國立陽明交通大學心智哲學研究所、大學社會責任計畫主辦,邀請「2020秋季智齡講堂」的講師們進行演講,將生與死的議題結合生命經驗,與大家一同探討在華人社會中避而不談的生死議題。

[第一場 5月13日]
10:00-11:00 重思生與死/講者:王文驊
11:00-12:00 我只有這輩子/講者:李碧華

第一場直播影片

[第二場 9月15日]
16:30-17:20 身心障礙者的困境與非享樂主義/講者:劉哲彰
17:30-18:20 身後二三事/講者:邱聰俞

[第三場年9月22日]
10:00-10:50 無需恐懼死亡/講者:吳榮輝
11:00-11:50 沒有靈魂卻自在的生命/講者:張燕復

[第四場年9月27日]
15:30-16:20 生死學讀書會分享/講者:洪光宗
16:30-17:20 我的生與死/講者:張志範

直播網址:https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCI-wzyt8FXRQuNFBmnnuV6g
備註:
1.因疫情防疫需求,演講已改為線上直播。
2.如有相關問題,請洽臉書粉絲專頁【智齡講堂】,或是官方LINE 帳號: @sxh8046h

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111學年度甄試入學招生考試訊息 https://phil.nycu.edu.tw/post-0046/ Wed, 01 Sep 2021 08:26:52 +0000 https://phil.nycu.edu.tw/?p=2012



報名日期(含上傳審查文件):
110年10月6日上午9點~110年10月12日下午5點止


報名連結 (近日公布)

簡章下載專區(近日公布)

報名應繳資料

  • 兩吋相片
  • 國內外學歷(力)證明文件
  • 大學歷年成績單(附排名)
  • 自傳(以英文撰寫)
  • 讀書或研究計畫 (以英文撰寫)
  • 學經歷表
  • 口試資料表
  • 其他有助於審查之資料
  • 推薦函2封

 

初試:書面審查(評分項目:讀書或研究資料、其他資料)

複試:面試(評分項目:哲學基本能力、學術研究能力,面試以英文進行並現場提供英文閱讀材料)

如欲詢問簡章內容,歡迎於上班時間來電/來信;如為報名系統操作問題,請洽本校教務處綜合業務組~

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【賀】嚴如玉副教授獲109學年度特色教學傑出獎 https://phil.nycu.edu.tw/post-0045/ Wed, 11 Aug 2021 08:58:31 +0000 https://phil.nycu.edu.tw/?p=1982

恭喜本所嚴如玉副教授獲陽明校區109學年度通識課程特色教學傑出獎殊榮。該獎項於110年8月10日公布,老師特別感謝一同參與課程的學生、助教以及多位社區長輩。

109-1學期通識課程: 心智與生死的價值哲學
109-2學期通識課程: 照護哲學



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【賀】畢業生高倚萱錄取The University of Western Ontario哲學系博士班 https://phil.nycu.edu.tw/post-0044/ Wed, 02 Jun 2021 08:03:30 +0000 https://phil.nycu.edu.tw/?p=1675

恭喜本所畢業生高倚萱同學申請上加拿大The University of Western Ontario哲學系
博士班並獲得獎助學金!

本所師生與有榮焉!



西安大略大學(University of Western Ontario)成立於1878年,為加拿大U15及老四校成員之一,作為該國頂尖研究型大學,享譽國際。其哲學所教員,設有哲學史(包含古典、中世紀與現代)、知識論、形上學、古典哲學、倫理學、語言哲學、心靈哲學及科學哲學等學位課程,近年來對於科學哲學方向頗有建樹,為加拿大國內科學哲學研究領域具極影響力之哲學院所,同時和加拿大眾多科學研究系所互動密切,如該校設立之Brain and Mind Institute,和滑鐵盧大學 Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics。


該校亦設有Rotman Institute of Philosophy與Centre for Digital Philosophy,前者透過結合科學家與哲學家,關注科學哲學中眾多理論問題及其在各個科學領域的實踐和倫理影響,範圍涵蓋從宇宙學至保護生態學、進化生物學和神經科學;後者則透過技術推動哲學研究並維護、開發PhilPapers、PhilPeople、PhilEvents 和 PhilJobs等一系列全球哲學家廣泛使用之線上服務。

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【王文方】華文哲學百科詞條_語意悖論 https://phil.nycu.edu.tw/post-0041/ Fri, 07 May 2021 03:01:03 +0000 https://phil.nycu.edu.tw/?p=1652 華文哲學百科詞條_語意悖論
王文方教授

導論

語意悖論 (the semantic paradoxes) 是與語意概念有關的各種悖論,常見而又重要的語意悖論包括各種說謊者悖論 (liar paradox) 與柯里悖論 (Curry’ s paradox)。傳說中,語意悖論的發現始自於西元前四世紀的希臘哲學家猷布里底司 (Eubulides of Miletus),但至今仍未獲得普遍被接受的解決方案,因而備受哲學家爭議與重視。一般認為,語意悖論是由於語意概念(或原則)與古典邏輯原則間的不一致所導致,但導致這個衝突的根本原因與解決方案卻極為分歧。語意悖論的解決之道在於提供一個從(古典或非古典)邏輯上來說一致(或至少非瑣碎 (non-trivial))的、從哲學上來說可信的語意概念理論,並藉此診斷出悖論產生的病灶。

由於十九世紀末形式邏輯的發展以及當代哲學對於語意悖論解悖方案的苛求,廿世紀以後哲學家對於語意悖論的討論與所提出的解悖方案,大多是越來越形式化,也越來越難讓缺乏良好邏輯訓練的哲學家(遑論一般人)理解。為了要能夠了解當代對語意悖論所提出的各種解悖方案與相關的討論,讀者們最好先知道一些當代邏輯與數學上的重要發現,特別是哥德爾 (K. Godel) 證明其「算術第一不完備性定裡」的過程中所使用的對角性引理 (diagonal lemma)、塔斯基 (A. Tarski) 的「(算術真理的)不可定義性定理」、以及克里普克 (S. Kripke) 對強克林三值模型所使用的固定點 (fixed point) 建構法。只有在對這些邏輯與數學上重要的結果有了足夠的瞭解之後,讀者們才能真正理解與欣賞當代各種推陳出新的語意悖論解悖方案。

目錄

1. 重要的語意悖論

2. 素樸真理原則與素樸真理論

3. 對角性引理與不可定義性定理

3.1 哥德爾的對角性引理
3.2 塔斯基的不可定義性定理
3.3 一些觀察

4. 克里普克的固定點建構

4.1 強克林三值模型的最小固定點
4.2 其他固定點

5. 古典的解悖方案

5.1 階層真理論與脈絡論
5.2 古典單一真謂詞理論

6. 非古典的解悖方案

6.1 弗完備解悖方案
6.2 弗一致解悖方案

全文請見:華文哲學百科

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【王文方】華文哲學百科詞條_堆垛悖論 https://phil.nycu.edu.tw/post-0040/ Fri, 07 May 2021 02:19:34 +0000 https://phil.nycu.edu.tw/?p=1620 華文哲學百科詞條_堆垛悖論
王文方教授

導論

堆垛悖論是一個歷史久遠的悖論,但對於該悖論的熱烈研究卻始自於 1975 年之後。由於堆垛悖論涉及了含混謂詞的使用,如「是一個禿子」這樣的謂詞,對於堆垛悖論的研究因而往往需要提出一個有關於含混謂詞的語意論以及連帶的邏輯理論。本詞條仔細說明了含混謂詞的一些特性以及與含混詞有關的一些原則,列出了堆垛悖論常見的三種型態,並大致描述了到目前為止哲學家針對該悖論所提出的各種解決方案。為了提醒讀者並非所有利用含混謂詞所作出的連鎖推論都有謬誤的嫌疑,本詞條最後一節特別說明了一個堆垛論證的有趣應用。

目錄

1. 含混性與其它語言現象

2. 堆垛悖論的常見類型

3. 與含混謂詞有關的一些原則與現象

3.1 與含混謂詞有關的原則
3.2 與含混謂詞有關的現象

4. 堆垛悖論的各種解決方案

4.1 採取古典二值語意論的理論
4.2 採取非古典語意論的理論
  4.2.1 真值函數理論
  4.2.2 非真值函數理論
  4.2.3 脈絡論

5. 堆垛論證的一個有趣應用

全文請見:華文哲學百科

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2021徵才公告2 https://phil.nycu.edu.tw/2021jobad-2/ Wed, 05 May 2021 09:39:25 +0000 https://phil.nycu.edu.tw/?p=1603

職 稱:專任教師一名(助理教授、副教授或正教授)
工作內容:2022年2月1日起聘、每學期必須至少開授研究所與大學部課程各一門
應徵條件:國內外大學哲學博士學位、具全英語授課能力

專長要求:科技倫理、神經倫理或生物倫理,且具有以下研究領域專長:
以生醫資通訊科技(biomedical information and communications technology)實作為研究對象的倫理、社會或政治哲學研究

申請資料清單:

1.學術履歷
2.博士論文完稿 或 5年內代表性學術著作4篇
3.推薦信至少2封 
4.研究規劃說明
5.教學經驗與方式說明
6.可開授課程之課程大綱 四份
(研究所兩份與大學部兩份。其中一份必須為全英文課綱)

以上檔案(除推薦信外)必須依照上列順序合併為同一份pdf檔,pdf檔名請命名為:[申請人全名]申請資料,
例如:王小安申請資料

申請資料寄送方式:

※推薦信:
請推薦者本人直接寄送至 hnyang@nycu.edu.tw 與 karenyan@nycu.edu.tw,並將email主旨及推薦信以下列方式命名:[申請人全名]推薦信,例如:王小安推薦信

※申請資料pdf檔:
請同時email至 hnyang@nycu.edu.tw 與 karenyan@nycu.edu.tw, Email主旨請命名為:[申請人全名]應徵國立陽明交通大學心智哲學研究所專任教師,例如:王小安應徵國立陽明交通大學心智哲學研究所專任教師

※申請資料寄送成功確認方式:秘書會在收到文件後回信確認。若寄出信件三天後,仍未收到確認信,請主動聯絡(02-2826-7000#65041; hnyang@nycu.edu.tw) 。

徵選程序:

經遴選委員書面評估後,入選者將通知參與面談,未獲錄取者將不另行通知。

預定起聘日期:2022年02月01日

申請截止日期:2021年6月30日 (以email寄送時間為憑)

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2021徵才公告1 https://phil.nycu.edu.tw/2021jobad-1/ Wed, 05 May 2021 09:23:44 +0000 https://phil.ym.edu.tw/?p=1589

職 稱:專任教師一名(助理教授、副教授或正教授)
工作內容:2022年2月1日起聘、每學期必須至少開授研究所與大學部課程各一門
應徵條件:國內外大學哲學博士學位、具全英語授課能力

專長要求:分析哲學,具以下其一研究領域專長尤佳:
◆人工智能哲學:以當代人工智能科技所涉及到的分析哲學問題為研究主題
◇跨領域心智哲學:以當代心智科學所涉及到的分析哲學問題為研究主題

申請資料清單:

1.學術履歷
2.博士論文完稿 或 5年內代表性學術著作4篇
3.推薦信至少2封 
4.研究規劃說明
5.教學經驗與方式說明
6.可開授課程之課程大綱 四份
(研究所兩份與大學部兩份。其中一份必須為全英文課綱)

以上檔案(除推薦信外)必須依照上列順序合併為同一份pdf檔,pdf檔名請命名為:[申請人全名]申請資料,
例如:王小安申請資料

申請資料寄送方式:

※推薦信:
請推薦者本人直接寄送至 hnyang@nycu.edu.tw 與 karenyan@nycu.edu.tw,並將email主旨及推薦信以下列方式命名:[申請人全名]推薦信,例如:王小安推薦信

※申請資料pdf檔:
請同時email至 hnyang@nycu.edu.tw 與 karenyan@nycu.edu.tw, Email主旨請命名為:[申請人全名]應徵國立陽明交通大學心智哲學研究所專任教師,例如:王小安應徵國立陽明交通大學心智哲學研究所專任教師

※申請資料寄送成功確認方式:秘書會在收到文件後回信確認。若寄出信件三天後,仍未收到確認信,請主動聯絡(02-2826-7000#65041; hnyang@nycu.edu.tw) 。

徵選程序:

經遴選委員書面評估後,入選者將通知參與面談,未獲錄取者將不另行通知。

預定起聘日期:2022年02月01日

申請截止日期:2021年6月30日 (以email寄送時間為憑)

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【新進教師】歡迎新聘教師加入心智哲學研究陣容 https://phil.nycu.edu.tw/post-0038/ Wed, 05 May 2021 07:37:04 +0000 https://phil.ym.edu.tw/?p=1568

自110學年度第一學期起,歡迎Michael Stuart副教授加入本所專任教師行列。Michael Stuart副教授是非常優秀且極富研究潛力的年輕學者,簡歷如下:

學歷:
Doctor of Philosophy from the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Toronto

經歷:
2018-23:
University of Geneva
SNSF Ambizione Fellow at the Department of Philosophy and Centre for Philosophy of Science

2020-2023: 
London School of Economics
Research Associate at the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science

2020-21: 
University of Tübingen
Research Fellow, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Center for Foundational Research

主要專長:科學哲學、心智哲學、人工智能
次要專長:知識論、科學中的價值理論、科學史

更多資訊請見個人網站:http://michaeltstuart.com/about-me/

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【林映彤】MEMORY VS. IMAGINATION: A PERSPECTIVE FROM SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES https://phil.nycu.edu.tw/post-0037/ Tue, 04 May 2021 07:22:20 +0000 https://phil.ym.edu.tw/?p=1469 MEMORY VS. IMAGINATION: A PERSPECTIVE FROM SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES
Ying-Tung Lin & Vilius Dranseika

What is the relationship between memory and imagination? What are the differences and similarities between them? These have long been topics of interest for philosophers both ancient and modern, and recent neuroimaging findings have brought a new perspective into the discussion (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; De Brigard, 2017; Schacter & Addis, 2007). Various views have been proposed to differentiate between memory and imagination, e.g., views that focus on the differences in vivacity, factivity, causes. Here, we attempt to draw attention to a perspective that has yet to be explored: the perspective of studies on self-consciousness.

Imagination is a crucial form of human freedom, as it allows our experience to go beyond what actually happens and has happened. In contrast to imagination, memory is constrained by what has been experienced by the subject in the past. Hopkins (2018) therefore characterizes remembering as a kind of imagining that is controlled by the past. However, it is not just what is remembered but also how it is remembered that is under such constraint. To put it another way, in order to be able to “re-experience” the past as one’s own past, the past also constrains how the self-experience appears in memory. Here, we discuss how imagination and episodic memory can differ with respect to self-consciousness.

To begin with, it is debatable whether it is possible to form an episode of imagination in which oneself is not included. That is, can we mentally simulate the conscious experience of a world in which we are not present as selves (Metzinger, 2011)? However, undoubtedly there cannot be episodic memory without self, as episodic memory is usually defined as personally experienced episodes (Tulving, 1972), the conscious reliving of a past experience (Tulving, 1985) or mental time travel into the past (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997). Here, it is implicitly assumed—yet not always explicitly explicated—that it is my own past experience that is consciously re-lived and my own past to which I mentally time travel. Self-consciousness is a crucial component in episodic memory that in our view is underexplored.

Second, in imagination, there is a question as to whether one can imagine oneself to be another and what such imagining consists in (Ninan, 2016; Williams, 1973). In contrast, given how episodic memory is defined, it cannot involve such simulation of being someone else. However, note that the idea of quasi-memory suggests the theoretical possibility of remembering past experiences as one’s own, while they are in fact not one’s own (Shoemaker, 1970). This—remembering past experiences of someone else—is distinct from remembering being someone else. The debates discussed above remain far from resolved, and as such the issue of whether these differences exist is yet to be settled. However, the fact that these debates exist in respect of imagination but not episodic memory indicates some differences between them.

In addition to the possibilities of no-self and being someone else, there may be other differences between remembering one’s past event and imagining a counterfactual scenario involving one’s self. What are the similarities and differences between self-experience in episodic memory and in imagination? Either a field or an observer perspective can be adopted in remembering and imagination. When taking a field perspective, one’s origin of visual perspective is located within one’s body, similar to the way the subject normally perceives the world and his/her own body. In contrast, when taking an observer perspective, a distinct vantage point—often outside one’s body—is adopted to view the simulated world and one’s own body. Various factors are shown to affect perspective-taking. In particular, there is a connection between perspectives and the personal assessment of self-change. It is found that the (in)compatibility between one’s current self-concepts (e.g., religious beliefs, political attitudes, and the nature of their relationships) and the actions visualized in memory or imagination affect the perspective adopted: Conflicting actions tend to be viewed from an observer perspective, whereas compatible actions are viewed from a field perspective (Libby and Eibach, 2011). The adoption of perspective in memory and imagination seems to be linked to the (in)compatibility between the imaginary or mnemonic content and the current autobiographical and emotional content.

It is worth mentioning that regarding perspective-taking when imagining being someone else, say, Napoleon, it is argued that it is not possible to entertain such imagination from an observer perspective (McCarroll, 2019; Ninan, 2007; Williams, 1966). The reason provided is that—compared with images of what would be seen from Napoleon’s field perspective—external images of Napoleon from an observer perspective do not “have enough me in them” to give rise to the imagination of being Napoleon. As for imagining or remembering oneself from an observer perspective, the content will involve internal perspectival modalities other than vision which allows one to “have enough me in them”. It is what is lacking when imagining being someone else from the observer perspective and what gives rise to psychological continuity or a sense of identity in imagination as well as in episodic memory.

Observer-perspective memory and imagination introduce further complexity in self-experience. In an observer-perspective memory or imagination, one’s first-person perspective is dissociated from the location of one’s remembered or imagined body. It evokes the question of how a sense of identity—the experience of being the same person as the one remembered or the one imagined—is formed in episodic memory and imagination (Fernández, 2018; Lin, 2018, 2020; McCarroll, 2018). How does one identify with oneself in an observer-perspective memory and imagination? Which self does one identify with: the one observing or the one observed in the scene? This issue offers a way of understanding the potential roles of the first-person perspective and embodiment in identification (Lin, 2018).

Our recent study on self-experience in imagination (Lin & Dranseika, submitted) provides some empirical data to explore felt identification in imagination. In our study, participants were asked to perform an observer-perspective imagination task (e.g., to imagine running on a deserted beach) and were then asked about their felt identification: whether it feels like they were (1) the one observing the scene from an external vantage point, (2) the one inside the scene (e.g., the person running on a deserted beach), (3) the one observing the scene and the one inside the scene at the same time, (4) switching between being the one observing the scene and the one inside the scene, or (5) other. We found that while there are different ways to identify with oneself in an observer-perspective imagination, almost half of the participants indicated that it felt like they were the one observing the scene from an external vantage point, approximately a quarter of the participants felt like they were both the one observing the scene and the one inside the scene, and very few indicated that it felt like they were the one inside the scene or they were switching between being the one observing the scene and the one inside the scene. Our study indicates the variety regarding identification in imagination by revealing how identification is associated with or dissociated from the first-person perspective or phenomenal property of embodiment.

Concerning the felt identification in observer-perspective memory, while it has never been studied, the pattern of identification may be different from what is observed in imagination. McCarroll (2018) argues that in episodic memory, the rememberer identifies with the one inside the scene and that the observer perspective is an unoccupied point of view—that is, the scene is merely presented from a certain point of view without the experiencer having had the experience of seeing as a character. However, there are other reasons to support other forms of identification (see Fernández, 2018; Lin, 2018, 2020).

As discussed above, perspective-taking in imagination and memory is constrained by the (in)compatibility between the imagery or mnemonic content and current autobiographical and emotional states (Libby and Eibach, 2011). In addition, imaginary and mnemonic contents affect one’s sense of identity in observer-perspective imagination and memory (McCarroll, 2019; Ninan, 2007; Williams, 1966). We question whether felt identification in observer-perspective memory and imagination may be similarly constrained. Furthermore, is there a difference in the constraints posed on felt identification in observer-perspective memory and imagination? There are at least two reasons to conjecture that the (in)compatibility between the mnemonic content and one’s autobiographical and emotional states shape one’s felt identification to a larger extent than is the case in imagination. First, memory is constrained by the past. Second, imagination does not require a (strong) sense of psychological continuity. Thus, a difference in felt identification in imagination and memory may be flexibility—the ease of identifying with a different target. As previously introduced, the diversity of identification in observer-perspective imagination across individuals was found. We suspect that such diversity may also be present across episodes of imagination within the same individual, and that it may be less flexible in observer-perspective episodic memory since it is likely to be more constrained by the (in)compatibility mentioned above. That is, we may have a more fixed target of identification in observer-perspective episodic memory—either the one observing the scene or the one in the scene—constrained by the actual rememberer’s current situation (e.g., emotional needs); on the other hand, in imagination, with less influence from such constraint, it may be more subject to change. For instance, one may be able to easily change which target to identify with or even voluntarily identify with any target in imagination. There may be such freedom in imagination, which is absent in episodic memory. However, this is purely conjecture on our part at this stage. More empirical studies on identification in imagination and episodic memory are required to test our hypothesis.

Here, we point out that with respect to self-experience, there are several ways in which memory and imagination differ. One of the key differences might be freedom or flexibility. Imagination not only offers counterfactual scenarios but also enables our selves to be variously presented in such experience—imagining oneself as someone else, imagining from a different perspective, and while adopting an observer perspective, identifying with different targets. It, however, remains to be seen whether some of these dimensions of variation in self-consciousness are in fact unique to imagination.

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合著者介紹:
Vilius Dranseika a PhD candidate at the Centre for Philosophy of Memory, Grenoble Alpes University, France, and a researcher at the Institute of Philosophy & Interdisciplinary Centre for Ethics, Jagiellonian University, Poland, and Institute of Asian and Transcultural Studies & Institute of Philosophy, Vilnius University, Lithuania. His research is focused on psychological underpinnings of philosophical concepts and theories.

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